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algorithmic agents who use a simple means-end heuristic.  These 
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than cognition or optimization) being an important determinant of efficient 
aggregate level outcomes. 
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Our knowledge of the very narrow limits of human rationality must 
dispose us to doubt that business firms, investors or consumers 
possess either the knowledge or computational ability that would 
be required to carry out the rational expectations strategy. 
Herbert Simon (1969) 
 
 
The claim that the market can be trusted to correct the effect of 
individual irrationalities cannot be made without supporting 
evidence, and the burden of specifying a plausible corrective 
mechanism should rest on those who make this claim. 
 Tversky and Kahneman (1986). 
 
 
The principal findings of experimental economics are that 
impersonal exchange in markets converges in repeated interaction 
to the equilibrium states implied by economic theory, under 
information conditions far weaker than specified in the theory. 
Vernon Smith (2008) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 A central feature of economic theory is derivation of equilibrium in 
economies populated by agents who optimize some well-ordered function such as 
profit or utility. Although it is recognized that actions of economic agents are 
subject to institutional constraints and feedback (D. North, 1990), exploration of 
the extent to which equilibrium arises from characteristics of the institutional 
environment, as opposed to the behavior of individuals, has been limited; 
Becker’s (1962) derivation of downward slope of demand functions is a notable 
exception.  The normal modeling technique is to ascribe sophisticated 
computational abilities to a representative agent to solve for equilibrium (J. F. 
Muth, 1961). Plott and Sunder (1982, henceforth PS) have shown that markets 
with uncertainty and asymmetrically distributed information (with two or three 
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states of the world) disseminate information and converge near rational 
expectations equilibria when populated with profit-motivated human traders. The 
present paper asks if the PS results can also be achieved by minimally intelligent 
traders (Gode and Sunder 1993) using the means-end heuristic, and reports an 
affirmative answer. 
 Simon (1969 Chapter 3) questioned the plausibility of human agents, with 
their limited cognitive abilities, forming rational expectations by intuition. 
Accumulated observational evidence on these cognitive limits of individuals 
shifted the burden of proof, and led to calls for evidence that markets can 
overcome such behavioral limitations (R. H. Thaler, 1986, A. Tversky and D. 
Kahneman, 1986).  
 Laboratory studies of markets populated by asymmetrically-informed 
profit-motivated human subjects reveal that their aggregate level outcomes tend to 
converge near the predictions of rational expectations theory (R. Forsythe and R. 
Lundholm, 1990, R. Forsythe et al., 1982, C. R. Plott and S. Sunder, 1982, 1988).  
However, since complex patterns of human behavior can only be inferred, not 
observed directly, it is difficult to know from human experiments which elements 
of trader behavior and faculties are necessary or sufficient for various markets to 
attain their theoretical equilibria
1
. This difficulty has led to claims that inability of 
human beings to optimize by intuition implies that economic theories based on 
optimization assumptions are prima facie invalid (for example, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1986)).  
 Such doubts about the achievability of mathematically derived equilibria, 
when individual agents are not able to perform complex optimization calculations, 
are understandable. From a constructivist point of view (V. L. Smith, 2008), 
                                                          
1
 See for example Dickhaut, Lin, Porter & Smith (2012) regarding conditions where markets with 
human traders are less likely to conform to predicted equilibria. 
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rational expectations equilibria place heavy demands on individual cognition to 
learn others’ preferences or strategies, and to arrive at unbiased estimates of 
underlying parameters of the economy by observing markets. In theory, 
disseminating and detecting information in markets calls for bootstrapping—
rational assessments are necessary to arrive in equilibrium and such assessments 
require observation of equilibrium outcomes. Cognitive and computational 
demands on individuals to arrive at economic equilibria, especially rational-
expectations equilibria, are high, raising doubts about the plausibility of 
equilibrium models (H. A. Simon, 1969).  
 Replacing humans by algorithms allows us to examine whether the use of 
certain simple heuristics by individual traders is  sufficient for attaining rational 
expectations equilibria (as a proof of concept). Without claiming that human 
traders actually use such heuristics, it is possible and useful to determine if 
heuristics making low computation demands on human reasoning might be 
sufficient for attaining equilibria in a given market environment.  Combining 
Newell and Simon’s (1972) means-end heuristic with Gode and Sunder’s (1993, 
1997) zero-intelligence (ZI) approach, we find and report that markets with 
uncertainty and asymmetric information attain outcomes approximating rational 
expectations equilibria, even when they are populated by simple minimally-
intelligent adaptive algorithmic traders. Since the statistical distribution of these 
outcomes is centered near the PS observations of markets with human traders, the 
convergence of their outcomes to equilibrium can be attributed to the combination 
of the market structure and the minimal levels of intelligence and adaptive ability 
built into the trading algorithms. Since these trader faculties are far less 
demanding than what is assumed in deriving the equilibria, and certainly within 
known human capabilities, we infer that the convergence of markets to rational 
expectations equilibria emerge mainly from the properties of the market and 
simple and plausible decision heuristics, rather than from complex and 
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sophisticated optimization (Gary Becker, 1962, Gode and Sunder, 1993, Gerd 
Gigerenzer and P. Todd, 1999, V. L. Smith, 2008). 
    
II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
 Instead of assuming sophisticated information processing capabilities and 
maximization objectives of agents, we can think of market structure constraining 
human behavior to guide their aggregate level outcomes to the neighborhood of 
theoretical equilibria.  Becker (1962) showed that the downward slope of demand 
functions arises from individuals having to act within their budget constraints, 
even if they choose randomly from their opportunity sets. Smith (1962) reported 
that classroom double auction markets populated by a mere handful of profit-
motivated student traders with minimal information arrive in close proximity of 
Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, Smith’s auction markets had little resemblance 
to the tâtonnement story often used to motivate theoretical derivations of 
equilibria.  
 Gode and Sunder (1993) combined Becker’s constrained random choice 
with Smith’s double auctions and reported the results of computer simulations of 
simple double auctions populated by “zero intelligence” (henceforth ZI) 
algorithmic traders who bid or ask randomly within their budget constraints (i.e., 
buyers do not bid above their private values and sellers do not ask below their 
private costs). Although these traders do not remember, optimize, maximize 
profits, or learn, simulated markets populated by such traders also reach the 
proximity of their theoretical equilibria, especially in their allocative efficiency. In 
simple double auctions without uncertainty or information asymmetry, theoretical 
equilibria are attainable with individuals endowed with only minimal levels of 
intelligence (not trading at a loss). Jamal and Sunder (1996) extended the results 
to markets with shared uncertainty with algorithmic agents using means-end 
heuristic (henceforth M-E,) developed by Newell and Simon (1972).  
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 Substitution of human subjects used in traditional laboratory markets by 
algorithmic agents using M-E heuristic has the advantage of helping us gain 
precise control of traders’ information processing and decision making (i.e., 
“cognitive”) abilities. Holding trader “cognition” constant at a specified level 
allows us to explore the properties of outcomes of market structures and 
environment (also, see Angerer et al. (2010); and Huber et al. (2010)). In contrast, 
we can neither observe nor hold invariant the strategies used by human traders. 
The use of algorithmic traders enables us to run longer computational 
experiments, randomize parameters in the experimental setting, and conduct 
replications without significantly more time or money.   
 The paper is organized in four sections. The second section describes a 
simple M-E heuristic used by minimally-intelligent algorithmic traders in a 
double auction market.  In the third section, we implement this heuristic in a 
market where some traders have perfect insider information (while others have no 
information) and compare the simulation results with the data from the profit-
motivated human experiments reported by PS.  The fourth section presents 
implications of the findings and some concluding remarks.  
III. MEANS-END HEURISTIC 
 Simon (1955) proposed bounded rationality as a process model to 
understand and explain how humans, with their limited knowledge and 
computational capacity behave in complex settings.  He postulated that humans 
develop and use simple heuristics to seek and attain merely satisfactory, not 
optimal, outcomes. To understand human problem-solving Newell and Simon 
(1972) developed General Problem Solver (GPS).  They adduced a large body of 
data which show that GPS is a robust model of human problem-solving in a wide 
variety of tasks and environments.  The key heuristic used by GPS is means-ends 
analysis (M-E or the heuristic of reducing differences). Gigerenzer et al. (1999) 
have focused on the usefulness and effectiveness of fast and frugal heuristics like 
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M-E in human life, whereas Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have documented a 
similar heuristic which they labeled anchor-and-adjust.   
 GPS recognizes knowledge states, differences between knowledge states, 
operators, goals, sub-goals and problem solving heuristics as entities. GPS starts 
with an initial (or current) knowledge state, and a goal or desired knowledge state. 
GPS then selects and applies operators that reduce the difference between the 
current state and the goal state.  The M-E heuristic for carrying out this procedure 
can be summarized in four steps: (i) compare the current knowledge state a with a 
goal state b to identify difference d between them; (ii) find an operator o that will 
reduce the difference d in the next step; (iii) apply the operator o to the current 
knowledge state a to produce a new current knowledge state a’ that is closer to b 
than a; and (iv) repeat this process until the current knowledge state a’ is 
acceptably close to the goal state b. Knowledge states of traders can be 
represented as aspiration levels  that adjust in response to experience (H. A. 
Simon, 1956).  The M-E heuristic for a trader thus requires a mechanism for 
setting an initial aspiration level, and a method for adjusting these levels in light 
of experience (e.g., Jamal and Sunder (1996)).  
A. Market Environment 
 Markets examined here are defined by four elements: (i) uncertainty, (ii) 
distribution of information, (iii) security payoffs, and (iv) rules of the market. 
Following PS we examine markets for securities with either two (X and Y) or 
three (X, Y, and Z) states of the world, where each state Si occurs with a known 
probability πi. One half of the traders in the markets (n=6) are informed about the 
realized state before trading starts each period, while the other half (n=6) are 
uninformed.  At the beginning of each period, each trader of type j (j=3 types in 
our experiment) is endowed with two units of a security which pays a single state-
contingent dividend DSj at the end of the trading period. There are no cash 
constraints. There are three types of traders and each trader type gets a different 
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dividend in a given state. The rules of the double auction are as follows: after a 
bid or ask is generated (see section 2.3 for details on algorithm for generating bids 
and asks), the highest bid price is compared to the lowest ask price.  If the bid 
price is equal to or greater than the ask price a trade occurs.  The recorded 
transaction price is set to be equal to the midpoint between the bid and ask prices.   
B. Implementing the M-E Heuristic2 
In the first of the two implementation steps, each agent’s initial knowledge 
state (aspiration level) is set equal to the expected value of the payoff based on its 
private information. The second step implements the idea that subjects without 
perfect information make gradual adjustments by applying weight γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) to 
newest observed price Pt, and weight (1- γ ) to their Current Aspiration Level 
(CALt). This process can be represented as a first-order adaptive process: 
CALt+1 = (1 - γ) CALt   + γ Pt.  (1) 
If CAL0 is the initial value of CALt, by substitution,  
CALt+1 = (1 - γ)
t+1
 CAL0   + γ ((1 - γ)
t
P1 + (1 - γ)
t-1
 P2 + … + (1 - γ) Pt-1 + Pt).
 (2) 
  In the context of markets organized as double auctions (where both buyers 
and sellers can actively propose prices to transact at), these two elements of the 
M-E heuristic—setting an initial aspiration level and gradually adapting it in light 
of  observed transaction prices constitute the entire heuristic activity of the agent
3
.  
Minimally Intelligent Algorithmic Agents 
Algorithmic agents use their “current aspiration level” (CAL) to 
implement a ZI strategy after Gode and Sunder (1993); they bid randomly chosen 
                                                          
2
 A flow chart and an outline code of the heuristic are available at http://www.zitraders.com, 
3
 Previous attempts to model individual human behavior has used processes very similar to 
equation 2 (Carlson, J. A. and T. B. Okeefe. 1969. "Buffer Stocks and Reaction Coefficients - 
Experiment with Decision Making under Risk." Review of Economic Studies, 36(4), 467-84, 
Carlson, John. 1967. "The Stability of an Experimental Market with a Supply-Response Lag." 
Southern Economic Journal, 33(3), 305-21. 
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prices below and ask randomly chosen prices above their aspiration levels.  
Traders draw a uniformly distributed random number between 0 and an upper 
limit of 1. If the number drawn is less than or equal to 0.5, the trader generates a 
bid; if the number drawn is greater than 0.5, it generates an ask.  The bid amount 
is determined by drawing a second random number between a lower bound of 0 
and an upper bound of the individual trader’s CAL.  If this bid exceeds the current 
high bid, it becomes the new high bid. Correspondingly, if the action is an ask, its 
amount is determined by generating a second random number in the range 
between the lower bound of the traders CAL and the upper bound of 1.  This 
newly generated ask becomes the new current low ask if it is less than the existing 
current low ask. These random draws from uniform distributions are generated 
independently. The algorithmic agents are myopic, making no attempt to 
anticipate, backward induct, or theorize about the behavior of other traders. They 
simply use the knowledge of observable past market events (transaction prices) to 
estimate their opportunity sets, and choose randomly from these sets.  
These markets are populated in equal numbers by traders of each payoff 
type of whom 50% are (and 50% are not) informed about the realized state of 
world. The informed algorithmic traders begin by setting their initial CAL using 




If realized state = X, CALX= DXj 
If realized state = Y, CALY = DYj   (3) 
  The uninformed traders of type j use their unconditional expected 
dividend value to set their initial CAL using the prior state probabilities
5
:  
CALj = Pr(X) * (DXj)  + Pr(Y) * (DYj)    (4) 
                                                          
4
 For 3-state markets, if realized state = Z, CALY = DZj. 
5
 For 3-state markets, CALj = Pr(X)*(DXj) +Pr(Y)*(DYj)+Pr(X)*(DZj). 
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 Since they know the state with certainty, informed traders do not update 
their CALs in response to observed transactions; they learn nothing about the state 
of the world from transaction prices.
6
  Uninformed traders of every dividend type, 
however, update their CALs after each transaction using the M-E heuristic (i.e., 
first-order adaptive process) given in [1] above.  
CAL updating is done with a randomly chosen value of the adaptive 
parameter   for the simulation (see the Experimental Design below).  Submission 
of bids and asks continues with the updated CALs serving as constraints on the 
opportunity sets of traders until the next transaction occurs, and this process is 
repeated for 5,000 cycles to the end of the period.  At the end of each period the 
realized state is revealed to all traders, dividends are paid to their accounts, and 
each trader’s security endowment is refreshed for the following period.  The 
uninformed algorithmic traders carry their end-of-period CAL forward and use it 
as the starting point in the following period.
7
 Since our traders have minimal 
intelligence, they do not learn by observing other’s behavior or make 
generalizations across markets. They act in a myopic way at all times to help 
examine the sufficiency of using such a strategy for attaining economic equilibria. 
 In the following period, informed traders again get a perfect signal about 
the state and set their CAL = DXj (or DYj ) depending on whether the signal 
received is X or Y (or Z in 3-state markets).  The uninformed traders use their end-
                                                          
6
 The informed traders could, for example, learn that in some states market prices are higher than 
their own dividend in that state, and thus raise their CAL to that higher level. Human traders, 
presumably, make this adjustment but our algorithmic traders are not allowed to make such 
adjustments. We should not, therefore, expect the markets with these minimally-intelligent agents 
to behave identically to the human markets.  
7
  It would have been possible for the agents to keep track of the prices associated with each 
realized state and use this information in subsequent periods. In the spirit of minimal intelligence, 
our agents do not do so, and uninformed agents simply carry forward their CAL from the end of 
one period to the beginning of the next period. The CAL of informed agents responds to a perfect 




of-period CAL from the preceding period as CAL0 to trade and to generate CAL1 
after the first transaction, and so on.   
C. Experimental Design 
We use the market design parameters from the PS’s (1982) human 
experiments for the present simulations (see Table 1).  We ran 50 replications of 
four markets numbered 2, 3, 4 and 5 as reported by PS’s (1982) human 
experiments (three states in Market 5, and two in the other three markets).
8
 The 
participants were freshly endowed with two securities every period and have no 
cash constraint.  For each of the 50 replications, the adjustment parameter γ was 
randomly and independently drawn from a uniform distribution U(0.05, 0.15)
9
. In 
each market, there are 12 traders who traded single period securities.  A random 
state of nature—X, Y, (or Z in case of 3-states)—was drawn at the start of each 
period to match the actual realizations observed in the PS’s markets. Except for a 
few initial periods (when no trader was informed), and in some final periods 
(when all traders were informed), six of these twelve traders had perfect inside 
information and the other six were uninformed. For consistency and ease of 





Insert Table 1 about here. 
                                                          
8
 Plott and Sunder (1982) found that the information structure of their Market 1 was too complex 
for it to reach rational expectations equilibrium in less than a dozen periods. Accordingly, we have 
not tried to replicate that information structure and market in the present simulations. 
9
 These ranges have been used in previous market simulation studies (Gode and Sunder  1993, 
1997; Jamal and Sunder 1996) and have no normative content per se. 
10
 In this paper we only report periods where six traders in the market are informed and the other 
six are uninformed.  We have also simulated periods where all traders were informed, or all were 
uninformed.  The results are not qualitatively different from human participants reported in PS.  
Full simulation results, including all periods with informed/uninformed traders are available at 
http://www.zitraders.com. This website also gives an outline of the code, and allows visitors to see 





IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
A. MARKETS WITH ASYMMETRIC INSIDER INFORMATION 
  Figure 1 shows the time chart of prices observed in five asymmetric 
information periods of a market populated with profit-motivated human traders 
(heavy  blue curve) reported in PS against the background of two theoretical (RE - 
solid green horizontal line) and Walrasian (PI – dashed brown horizontal line) 
predictions for respective periods .  The red curve in medium thickness plots the 
median of prices from 50 replications (shown as a cloud) of the same market with 
M-E heuristic algorithmic traders. The adaptive parameter γ is randomly and 
independently drawn each period from a uniform distribution U(0.05, 0.15) and is 
identical across all traders.  Six of the twelve traders have perfect inside 
information and the other six are uninformed. Allocative efficiency and trading 
volume are shown numerically for each period in Table 2. 
  Figure 1 indicates: (i) In state X (with low RE price of 0.24 in periods 7 
and 9), transaction prices of both human traders (blue curve) and algorithmic 
traders (red curve) approach the RE equilibrium level from above. (ii) In state Y 
(with higher RE price of 0.35 in periods 10 and 11), transaction prices of both 
human traders and algorithmic traders generally approach and get close to the 
equilibrium level from below. (iii) As shown in Table 2 for Market 2, in State X 
(low RE price) periods, average trading volume for human traders across the two 
periods is 19.5 while the average volume for algorithmic traders is 17.5. The 
allocative efficiency of human trader markets across the two X periods is 63.5%, 
while efficiency of the simulated markets is 80.3%. Note that allocative efficiency 
arises from having the appropriate number of securities being acquired by the 
appropriate type of traders as specified by rational expectations equilibrium.  
Efficiency levels (below 100%) arise when the wrong type of traders are holding 
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some of the securities.  In State Y (high RE price) periods, human traders’ average 
volume is 19.3 (vs. 23.7 for algorithmic traders) and human trader efficiency is 
100%, while algorithmic traders achieve efficiency levels of 98.7%.   The 
direction and volume of trading is close to the predictions of RE equilibrium.  
 There are also important differences between the convergence paths for 
human and simulated markets:  convergence of prices to RE predictions with 
human traders is tighter and progressively faster in later periods; algorithmic 
simulations exhibit little change from early to later realizations of the same state 
(X or Y).  Efficiency results also show human subjects improving over time (when 
State is X), whereas markets populated with algorithmic traders show less 
improvement over time. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 about Here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Replication of the additional 2-state markets (Markets 3 and 4) with 
different parameters (see Figures 2 and 3 and the two middle sections of  Table 2) 
show essentially the same pattern of convergence except that in State Y (with low 
RE price) human traders have a tendency to converge quickly to the RE price, 
especially in later periods (not coming from above or below) whereas the paths 
with algorithmic traders depend on history in the previous period (because the 
CAL of the uninformed traders is carried forward from previous periods). If the 
previous period is State X (high RE price) the simulation converges from above; if 
the previous period is State Y (low RE price), the simulation converges from 
below the RE price. As expected, algorithmic traders adjust slowly and learn 
myopically without any global awareness of equilibrium prices. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




 Figure 4 displays data for a three-state market reported by PS with human 
traders, and an identical market replicated for this paper with algorithmic traders. 
The solid green horizontal line indicates the rational expectations (dashed brown 
line for PI) equilibrium price for the respective periods. Allocative efficiency and 
trading volume for Market V are shown numerically for each period in the bottom 
section of Table 2.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Figure 4 indicates: (i) In state Z (with high RE price of 0.32), for both 
human (blue line) and algorithmic traders (red line) transaction prices approach 
and get close to the RE equilibrium level from below. (ii) In state Y (with  RE 
price of 0.245 in the middle of the other two states), transaction prices also 
generally approach and get close to the equilibrium level from below in both 
human and simulated markets. (iii) In state X transaction prices generally 
approach from below, the only exception occurs in Period 11 when the market 
converges from above in both human and simulated markets.  It appears that 
moving from a high equilibrium price state to a lower price state may cause 
convergences from above.  Otherwise, both humans and our simulated traders 
tend to approach the equilibrium price from below. (iv) Trading volume in all 
three states is generally greater than the predicted volume of 16 trades. For human 
traders volume tends to range from 15-23 trades, whereas algorithmic traders 
volume ranges from 14-24 trades. (v) In all periods of State Z (high RE price), 
allocative efficiency for human traders is 100% whereas algorithmic traders 
achieve 98.8% efficiency.  In State Y (middle RE price) periods, allocative 
efficiency of human traders averages 96.8% (100% efficiency in all periods 
except the first realization of State Y) whereas algorithmic traders achieve 95.4% 
efficiency and do not achieve 100% efficiency in any individual period. In State X 
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(low RE price) periods, allocative efficiency of human traders averages 87.7% 
whereas algorithmic traders achieve 91.5% efficiency.   Table 2 shows volume 
and efficiency numerically. Again, it is clear that, outcomes of markets with 
profit-motivated human and minimally intelligent algorithmic traders exhibit the 
same central tendencies of convergence towards the predictions of rational 
expectations models. Apparently, the structural constraints of the market rules, 
and Newell and Simon’s (1972) simple means-end heuristics are sufficient to 
yield this result even as the number of states in the market increases from 2 states 
to 3.  
B. PRICE CHANGES, VOLUME AND EFFICIENCY 
To assess price convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium, we 
report results of a procedure used by Gode and Sunder (1993) who regressed the 
root mean squared deviation between transaction and RE equilibrium prices on 
the natural logarithm of the transaction sequence number within a period. If prices 
move towards RE levels over time, the slope coefficient of this regression should 
be less than zero. Four panels of Figure 5 show the behavior of this root mean 
square deviation over time for the four human and simulated market pairs. Results 
of ordinary least squares regressions of MSD on log of transaction sequence 
number in  human and simulated markets are shown in two triplets in each panel 




 respectively. Three of the four human (with the 
exception of Market II), as well as all four simulated markets exhibit significant 
convergence to RE equilibrium, and the zero-slope hypothesis is rejected in favor 
of negative slope alternative at p < 0.000 for the seven of the eight (human and 
simulated) markets.  About 80% of the reduction in the deviation from RE 
equilibria being explained by log of transaction sequence number. Figure 5 shows 
                                                          
11
 We report results using the same format as Plott and Sunder (1982) so our 
simulation results can be compared with the human experiment results. 
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that root mean squared deviation of transaction from RE equilibrium prices tends 
towards 0.  
 Across all 32 periods of the four markets, the difference between the 
trading volume and efficiency (Table 2, charted in Figures 6 and 7) of human and 
simulated markets is not statistically different (average volume of simulated 
market is about one trade greater than for human markets with t-statistic of 1.35 
and the average efficiency of simulated markets is 1.6% lower than that of 
markets with human traders (t-statistic of -1.08). There is no significant difference 
between the volumes and efficiency of markets with human traders as opposed to 
algorithmic traders. The inference is not that these simple algorithms capture all 
or even most of the behavior of the humans; that is not true. However, when seen 
through the perspective of aggregate market outcomes—prices, allocations, 
trading volume, and efficiency—in their central tendency, these simple heuristics 
appear to be sufficient to explain the human subject convergence to RE equilibria 
in these markets. 
 
C. MINIMUM INFORMATION CONDITIONS 
We altered the simulation to conduct a sensitivity analysis to see what 
would happen when the market is populated with the minimum number of 
informed traders for markets 2, 3 and 4
12
.  In each market this means that we 
provide information to only one type of trader.  Since there are three types of 
traders in each market the minimum number of informed traders is three
13
.  All of 
the remaining parameters were identical to other simulations.   We ran the 
simulation series twice, once with 5,000 iterations and a second time with 10,000 
iterations.  This was done to see if the number of iterations was a limiting factor. 
                                                          
12
 Due to the structure of Market 5 we are not able to decrease the number of informed traders. 
13
 One for each type. 
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Table 3 provides the results of the sensitivity analysis.  
For the 5,000 iteration simulation runs, efficiency levels reported in Table 
3 range from 80% to 88% whereas the comparable efficiency levels with 6 
informed traders in Table 2 range from 89.5% to 95%. The average efficiency 
levels drop by about 7% when the number of informed traders of each type is 
reduced from 2 to 1.  Increasing the number of iterations to 10,000 as reported in 
Table 3 yields an efficiency range of 82% to 89%; there is not much improvement 
obtained by increasing the length of time available to trade.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about Here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We also conducted a simulation in which we increased the number of each 
type of informed trader to three (for a total of nine informed traders out of a total 
of twelve traders).    Efficiency levels with 9 informed traders range from 89.5% 
to 94% which is essentially the same as the range obtained with 6 informed 
traders (compared with range 89.5-95% in Table 2)
14
.  These results suggest that 
the presence of even very few informed traders (one of each type in our case) may 
be sufficient for the market to approach rational expectations equilibria. 
Additional increases in the number of informed traders (from 1 informed trader of 
each type to 2) improves market performance a bit; however, gains from 
increasing the number of informed traders flattens out quickly and there is little 
further improvement from increasing the number of informed traders of each type 
from 2 to 3. 
We note that in the high equilibrium price state (Y in Market 2 and X in 
Markets 3 and 4; see Table 1), each market achieves close to 100% efficiency 
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both for human traders and algorithmic traders (with 3, 6 or 9 insiders – see 
Figure 8). We conjecture that in the high price state,   informed traders are buyers 
who have no budget constraint so they can keep bidding up the price until all 
feasible trades have occurred. In the low equilibrium price state, both human and 
algorithmic traders have lower efficiency levels, generally close to 80% on 
average see Figure 8). We conjecture that these lower efficiency levels occur due 
to the restriction on short-selling in our simulations, particularly in the low-priced 
state when the informed traders are sellers rather than buyers.  Since there are 
only three informed traders in each market, this means that there are a total of six 
tokens held by informed traders.  Once the informed traders have sold all their 
tokens, there are generally no further trades available since the CALs of the 
uninformed traders are usually higher than the prior trade price and the informed 
traders cannot take advantage of this price discrepancy and drive the market price 
towards the RE equilibrium. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have presented evidence that individual behavior, modeled by simple 
means-end heuristics and minimal-intelligence, is sufficient to yield market-level 
outcomes centered around the equilibrium levels derived from strong assumptions 
about optimization by individual agents. This occurs even though our algorithmic 
traders lack any learning capacity and thus are unable to make even simple 
inferences from previous experience to improve their current and future 
performance. This lack of learning preserves the spirit of Zero Intelligence (ZI) 
models of behavior (Gode and Sunder 1993), and makes it more difficult for our 
algorithmic traders to achieve the high levels of economic efficiency (and 
learning across periods) exhibited by human subjects in experiments. 
 Even if this key optimization assumption of theory were descriptively 
invalid, it does not necessarily undermine the validity and predictive value of the 
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theory at the aggregate level. Our findings are consistent with Gigerenzer et al. 
(1999) who built on Simon’s bounded rationality paradigm by proposing that 
individuals use “fast and frugal” heuristics to successfully accomplish complex 
tasks. 
The computational or other “cognitive” abilities of our algorithmic traders 
do not exceed, indeed are far weaker than, the documented faculties of human 
cognition. Yet, these simulated markets with insider trading based on asymmetric 
access to information converge to the close proximity of rational expectations 
equilibria and attain high allocative efficiency. Contrary to claims made in 
behavioral economics literature (R. H. Thaler, 1986, A. Tversky and D. 
Kahneman, 1974), we find that individuals using a simple means-end heuristic 
(analogous to Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974 anchor–and-adjust heuristic) in a 
market setting generate outcomes close to the rational expectations equilibrium. 
We interpret the results to suggest that, even in these relatively more complex 
market environments (as compared to Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997) and Jamal 
and Sunder (1996)), allocative efficiency of markets remains largely a function of 
their structure, not intelligence or optimizing behavior of agents.  Attention to 
understanding the role of market structure, not just human cognition, may help 
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Market Corresponding Market State Probability 
 Dividends For Each Trader Type 
  
RE  Predictions 
Price 
PI  Predictions 
Price  
        Type I Type II Type III  (Allocation to)* (Allocation to)* 
         
2 
  
Plott and Sunder 1982 
Market 2 
X 0.333 0.1 0.2 0.24 0.24(III) 0.266(Iu) 
Y 0.667 0.35 0.3 0.175 0.35(I) 0.35(Ii) 
                 
3 
  
Plott and Sunder 1982 
Market 3 
X 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.125 0.4(I) 0.4(Ii) 
Y 0.6 0.1 0.15 0.175 0.175(III) 0.22(Iu) 
                 
4 
  
Plott and Sunder 1982 
Market 4 
X 0.4 0.375 0.275 0.1 0.375(I) 0.375(Ii) 
Y 0.6 0.1 0.15 0.175 0.175(III) 0.21(Iu) 




Plott and Sunder 1982 
Market 5 
  
X 0.35 0.12 0.155 0.18 0.18(III) 0.212(Iu) 
Y 0.25 0.17 0.245 0.1 0.245(II) 0.245(IIi) 
Z 0.4 0.32 0.135 0.16 0.32(I) 0.32(Ii) 
                 
 
aPlott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders (half informed about the state, and half 
uninformed) to ascertain whether they traded at prices (and quantities) predicted by rational expectations models. Table 1 shows 
the parameters used in the experiment and the predictions about price and which trader type should hold securities in these 
markets. Our simulation uses the same parameters as those used in the PS experiment. Traders have two tokens each available for 
trade, and no cash constraints. 
 
*Allocation code: I, II, and III for all traders of types I, II, and III respectively.  Ii for informed traders of type I, Iu for uninformed 




Table 2:  




Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders to ascertain whether they traded at prices (and 
quantities) predicted by rational expectations models. Table 2 shows the number of transactions and efficiency levels attained by human 
traders, as well as simulated algorithmic traders who use a simple linear heuristic to update aspiration levels. The number of transactions 



































































































































































































































































Table 3:  




Table 3 shows the number of transactions and efficiency levels for simulated algorithmic traders who use a simple linear heuristic to 
update aspiration levels.  We conducted a sensitivity analysis to show how reducing the number of informed traders affects market 
outcomes with both 5000 iterations and 10000 iterations.  The final column shows the average of all sessions for the corresponding 














































































































































































































Time Chart of Prices in a 2 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 2 of Plott & Sunder (1982) 
 
Caption: Figure 1 shows the price paths in Market 2 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for 
mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders).  Each black dot in the 
“cloud” is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number.  The green straight line and the brown broken line 






Time Chart of Prices in a 2 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 3 of Plott & Sunder (1982) 
 
Caption: Figure 2 shows the price paths in Market 3 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for 
mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders).  Each black dot in the 
“cloud” is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number.  The green straight line and the brown broken line 






Time Chart of Prices in a 2 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 4 of Plott & Sunder (1982) 
 
Caption: Figure 3 shows the price paths in Market 4 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for 
mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders).  Each black dot in the 
“cloud” is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number.  The green straight line and the brown broken line 






Time Chart of Prices in a 3 State Market Versus Human Trader Data from Market 5 of Plott & Sunder (1982) 
 
Caption: Figure 4 shows the price paths in Market 5 of Plott and Sunder (1982) for periods where participants have different information (heavy blue line for 
mean price in markets with human traders; medium red line for median of 50 replications of simulated markets with algorithmic traders).  Each black dot in the 
“cloud” is an observed transaction price in the simulated markets plotted by transaction sequence number.  The green straight line and the brown broken line 







Mean Squared Deviation of Observed Prices from RE Equilibrium Prices 
 
Caption: Figure 5 charts the progression of mean squared deviation of observed prices from RE equilibrium prices with respect to transaction sequence numbers 
(heavy blue line for price in markets with human traders; medium red line for algorithmic traders). In human Market 4, the first five root mean squared deviations 
exceed 0.02 (for a maximum of 0.145 for transaction 3), and are out-of-scale chosen for the y-axis.  Ordinary Least Squares regression (MSD = α + β log 
Transaction No.) estimates of β, p-value and R
2
 for human and algorithmic markets are shown numerically in boxes inside each chart (e.g., in market 5:  β = -
0.00082, p-value = 0.001 and R
2
















Figure 8: Average Efficiency of Transactions for Algorithm Traders by the number of informed traders 
 in each market for high and low equilibrium price states. 
 
